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Abstract 
To date little attention has been paid to how social cognitive bias can influence how 
financial advisors interpret and respond to the needs of millionaire investors, and if this varies 
depending on the gender of the investor. This research investigates whether experienced 
professional financial advisors who work with millionaire investors make different attributions 
for the control and knowledge that investors have of their investments, and if they make 
different investment portfolio recommendations to equivalent male and female investors. 
Using methodology novel to finance, this vignette-based study that controls for gender finds 
evidence that professional financial advisors judge millionaire female investors to have less 
control over their investment portfolios relative to men. Empirical results also show that female 
advisors judge women to be less knowledgeable about investments than men. Despite such 
perceptual differences, advisors recommend equally risky portfolios to male and female 
investors. These results have implications for wealth management institutions and the 
monitoring of financial advisors for millionaire individuals. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing literature in behavioural finance shows that investors rely on their own 
perceptions and intuitive beliefs when making investment decisions, rather than selecting 
efficient portfolios that optimally balance risk and reward (Benartzi and Thaler 2001; 
Kahneman 2003). However, a large proportion of millionaires do not make investment 
decisions themselves, but rely instead on advice provided by financial advisors. As such, these 
investment decisions also depend on the judgements that advisors make about the needs and 
preferences of their clients (i.e., the investors). To date, very little research has considered how 
advisors judge the needs of their clients, or indeed the role that social cognition plays in the 
way that advisors make sense of their clients’ needs. More specifically, there has been little 
consideration of how social cognitive bias may differentially impact how advisors interpret and 
make sense of the needs and preferences of different groups (e.g., male and female investors), 
and how this in turn influences advisors’ portfolio recommendations. 
This paper addresses this notable lacuna in existing research by drawing on attribution 
theory from social psychology (Harvey et al. 2014), and by utilising vignette methodology to 
investigate whether practising professional financial advisors explain and respond to the needs 
and preferences of male and female millionaire investors differently. Vignettes, (i.e., pen-
portraits of fictional millionaire investors), are used to ascertain the judgements that advisors 
make aboutthe investment knowledge, control and risk tolerance of potential clients. This 
methodology, which is frequently used in social psychology yet novel to finance, is effective 
in extracting attitudes and judgements in quantitative research (Schoenberg and Ravdal 2000). 
In this study, the vignettes allow for a clean experiment where each of the ten vignettes 
explicitly defines a client and provides the same information to advisors who rate the vignettes.  
 By introducing attribution theory to behavioural finance, and asking financial advisors 
working with millionaire investors to complete an innovative vignette based survey, it is 
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possible to investigate whether advisors judge the needs of male and female fictional 
millionaire investors, with the same characteristics and circumstances, in the same manner or 
whether they exhibit a bias. The study tests the hypotheses that social cognitive bias leads 
experienced advisors who work with millionaire investors to (a) perceive female investors as 
having less knowledge and control over their investments than men, and (b) to recommend 
comparatively less risky investment portfolios to women.  
The study makes several contributions to the behavioural finance literature. Firstly, it 
draws on attribution theory to provide a basis for predicting and studying the potential for social 
cognitive bias in interpersonal decision-making. While this theory has received extensive study 
in other fields of psychology and social judgement, it has yet to be fully explored in the context 
of financial advice. Secondly, the research design introduces a new and innovative 
methodology (i.e., vignettes), which provides a tried and tested method to investigate gender 
and other group differences in the way that financial advisors support and advise clients. 
Thirdly, the study investigates the judgements of individuals who work as financial advisors 
and have many years of experience advising millionaire clients. As such it extends existing 
research beyond laboratory based studies and considers the judgements of experts rather than 
novices. Finally, the research is important because it focuses on a specific need, namely the 
importance of providing appropriate and valid advice to millionaire female investors, a group 
that is growing significantly in size, yet for whom advice is often perceived as unsatisfactory 
(Friedland 2013). 
1.1 Millionaire Investors 
According to the World Wealth Report (2013), high net worth, or ‘millionaire’ 
investors are defined as individuals who hold at least US$1million, or the equivalent, in 
financial or investable assets. Millionaires play an important investment role in the global 
economy. For example, in the UK, millionaires own 46% of the household wealth, and the UK 
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has the third highest number of millionaires globally (Credit Suisse 2016).  In 2015, when the 
data for this study were collected, 961,000 UK households had assets worth over US$1m 
excluding property and luxury goods; a 12.4% increase from the previous year (Boston 
Consulting Group 2016). There are also approximately 40 financial institutions in the UK that 
provide support for these individuals and manage in excess of US$50 million each (A.T. 
Kearney 2013).  
Among the wealthy, female wealth growth has outpaced that of men. The Telegraph 
reported that women aged between 22-29 years are earning more than men (Fraser 2015), and 
by 2020 it is predicted that women will make up 53% of all UK millionaires (Centre for 
Economics and Business Research 2013). Women's economic empowerment therefore 
represents a major social change (The Economist December 30, 2009). Yet, despite this 
apparent financial success, there is evidence that women remain disadvantaged relative to men 
in terms of their investments. For example, while women have a longer life expectancy than 
men (83 compared to 79 years: World Health Organization 2016), they are less likely than men 
to have a pension plan (Hung and Yoong 2010), and those women who do have a pension plan 
have built up a smaller amount typically due to a higher prevalence of part-time work and 
taking time out for family care. Moreover, women have been shown to have a lower allocation 
to risky assets in their retirement savings (Sundén and Surette 1998). Interestingly there is also 
evidence from recent studies that indicates women are more likely to be dissatisfied with their 
financial advisors compared to men, and typically perceive financial advising to be a male 
orientated activity (Friedland 2013). These findings have prompted many investment 
organisations to question what more they can do to better understand and support the needs of 
wealthy women, and ultimately to attract and retain this important client group.  
However, one area that has received relatively little attention from finance researchers 
to date, concerns the way in which advisors interpret and explain client needs, and how this 
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can be influenced by unconscious stereotypical assumptions or group bias. For example, 
studies investigating social cognition in other work contexts have found that people are 
routinely and often unconsciously biased in the way they perceive others, including making 
different causal judgments about the needs and behaviour of men and women (Deaux and 
Major 1987; Feather and Simon 1975).   This study builds on existing work by drawing on 
attribution theory to investigate whether financial advisors interpret the needs of equivalent 
male and female millionaire investors differently, and whether these differences affect the 
portfolio recommendations they make. 
2. Background on Advising Investors: Attribution Theory 
By introducing cognitive psychology to the traditional rational agent model, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1986) demonstrated robust and consistent evidence of irrational decision 
making behaviour among investors previously unexplained by traditional rational economic 
theory. They argued that the rational economic theory had been “conceived as a normative 
model of an idealised decision maker, not as a description of the behaviour of real people” 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1986, 251). In doing so attention shifted to the subjective and 
sometimes irrational biases that influence decisions. Behavioural finance researchers have been 
particularly interested in the impact of psychological bias on investor decision-making 
(Muradoglu and Harvey 2012) and how different biases illustrate errors that investors make as 
they allow irrational behaviour into their decision making process. Kahneman (2003) describes 
these as emotional brain filters that allow emotions to manipulate decision making. 
Loewenstein et al. (2001) suggest that risk attitudes are emotional expressions, rather than 
rational evaluations, with situational complexity and uncertainty likely to increase the influence 
of emotions (Forgas 1995).  
While behavioural finance adds complexity to traditional models that explain optimal, 
but not actual, decision making behaviour (Nofsinger 2005), its focus has tended to remain on 
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decisions about investments rather than decisions about investors. For example, studies have 
explored the influence of self-attribution bias on investor decisions; researchers have shown 
that individuals are consistently more likely to attribute positive outcomes (e.g., successful 
investment) to self and negative outcomes (e.g., unsuccessful investment) to external causes, 
making it difficult for investors to learn from their mistakes (Hoffmann and Post 2014) and 
improve their investment outcomes. Mittal (2010) found evidence that investors differ in the 
extent to which they demonstrate this self-attribution bias, and that investors showing high 
levels of bias are more likely to believe that they have both superior knowledge relative to 
others and a belief that they can outperform the market (Barber and Odean 1999). Those 
investors who are prone to the self-attribution bias have a tendency to realise gains too quickly 
and to hold on to underperforming investments (Feng and Seasholes 2005). Overconfident 
investors also attach importance to past return experiences to reinforce their convictions 
(Hoffmann and Post 2016) leading them to trade too much, generating higher transaction costs 
and ultimately lower returns (Hoffmann and Post 2016; Odean 1999).  
As yet very little behavioural finance research has considered interpersonal 
attributional bias in situations where one individual (i.e., a professional financial advisor) gives 
investment advice to another (i.e., a client). These situations require the advisor to interpret the 
client’s needs, and to make a recommendation about how he or she should invest their wealth 
on the basis of these interpretations. In these situations, interpersonal and inter-group 
attributional bias have been shown to influence the way in which observers interpret and 
respond to the behaviour and needs of others (Kelley 1973; Martinko and Thomason 1998). 
2.1 Delegated Portfolio Management 
Unlike self-managed wealth, wealth managed through financial advisors involves joint 
decision making within an agency relationship. This is defined by Ross (1973, 134) as a 
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“relationship... between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on 
behalf of, or as representative for the other, in a particular domain of decision problems”.  
In this study, the principal (i.e., the investor) delegates some decision making authority 
to the agent (Jensen and Meckling 1976) by appointing them as their investment portfolio 
advisor responsible for providing them with information and investment advice (Bhattacharya 
and Peiderer 1985). In the UK, the activities of financial advisors are regulated by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) in order to protect investors and ensure fair treatment. Importantly, 
in situations where investors engage a professional financial advisor, investment decisions are 
not made in isolation, but rather in conversation with the advisor. He or she can then influence 
the decision making process by providing information and advice about different investment 
possibilities, depending on their understanding of the investor's need. .  
Yet, like investors, professional advisors can be vulnerable to cognitive bias (De Bondt 
1998; Chalmers and Reuter 2010; Karabulut 2011) and may also fail to correct the biases an 
investor may have (Mullainathan, Noeth and Schoar 2012). It is therefore possible that 
advisors’ judgements about clients, and any recommendations they make, will be influenced 
by the stereotypes and assumptions they have about investors' needs, based on investor 
characteristics such as gender.  
2.2 Gender differences 
Gender differences are of particular interest to wealth management institutions and 
regulators due to the rapid growth in female wealth and the resultant economic impact of 
investment decisions made by women. Differences in the investment behaviour between men 
and women are well documented. Previous research has found that women invest less, trade 
less frequently and select lower risk investments in their portfolios, and with a smaller 
allocation into risky assets, it is argued that women are more risk averse Charness and Gneezy 
(2012) and Koedijk, Pownall, and Statman (2015). Studies show that women also tend to 
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perceive themselves as less confident in making investment decisions (Estes and Hosseini 
1988; Barber and Odean 2001), and are generally and historically less financially literate than 
men (Campbell 2006; Lusardi and Mitchell 2007). Dwyer, Gilkeson and List (2002) find that 
this lower financial literacy translates into women making lower risk investment decisions. 
Agnew et al. (2008) report a similar link between lower financial literacy, confidence and 
increased risk aversion, with 38% of women in their study opting for a less risky annuity 
retirement option compared to 29% of men. These findings provide further support for Sundén 
and Surette’s (1998) assertion that women make less risky retirement asset allocation choices 
than men. 
However, extant research has generally focused on identifying differences between the 
preferences and styles of male and female investors, with women typically perceiving 
themselves to be less knowledgeable about investing, less confident when making investment 
decisions and more likely to demonstrate a lower risk tolerance which translates into a desire 
for lower risk investments decisions compared to men (Barber and Odean 2001, 2002; Croson 
and Gneezy 2009; Hira and Loibl 2008). Yet to date there has been no attempt to investigate 
whether such differences might arise because women receive different investment advice based 
on advisors’ assumptions about their risk tolerance. For example, while many wealthy women 
engage professional advisors to guide them through the investment decision making process, 
less is known about whether the risk tolerance of female and male investors is perceived 
differently by professional financial advisors. 
Evidence that such differences may exist can be found in research concerned with 
attribution theory, which considers the everyday causal explanations that people make both for 
their own behaviours and the behaviour of others (Harvey et al. 2014; Heider 1958; Weiner 
1985; Wong and Weiner 1981), which in turn influence future decisions and actions (Fincham 
and Jaspars 1979; Martinko and Thomason 1998). Attribution theorists have studied the impact 
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that perceptions, biases and stereotypes have on behaviour, particularly in relation to their 
impact on differential decision-making for men and women (Silvester and Koczwara 2012). 
For example, in work psychology, attributional rationalisation is the tendency for managers 
to attribute successful performance by women to unstable and circumstantial causes (e.g., effort 
and luck) and equivalent male performance to internal and stable causes (e.g., ability) as a 
result of in-group/out-group bias (Heilman, Block, and Martell 1995; Swim and Sanna 1996). 
There is now considerable evidence that observers make different judgements depending on 
the gender of the observed, with female success more typically attributed to luck (Deaux and 
Emswiller 1974; Feather and Simon 1975). In the workplace, Silvester and Koczwara (2012) 
found that senior managers attributed the success of female junior managers to more external 
and temporary causes like the actions of others, while they attributed success on the part of 
junior male managers to more internal controllable and stable causes like talent and ability. In 
general, observers tend to judge men to have more control or confidence over their actions than 
women (Weiner et al. 1971). 
To date, however, no research has considered this bias in the context of investment 
advice; nor to whether it might lead advisors to perceive the needs of wealthy male and female 
investors differently, and thus to provision of different types of investment advice. Yet 
circumstantial evidence exists to support this proposition, for example, a study of 
undergraduate students by Daruvala (2007) found that both male and female observers, (i.e., 
the students in the sample), judged women to be more risk-averse than men. Likewise, in a 
study conducted in the financial services industry, Wang (1994) found that brokers providing 
investment advice to individuals with US$25,000 to invest, allocated less time and 
recommended less risky investments to women relative to men.  
The existence of biased social perception is likely to be particularly important for 
wealthy investors who rely on advisors who make investment recommendations on their 
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behalf. Yet, existing research focuses on how professional advisors are prone to behavioural 
biases when making investment decisions, rather than whether the perception that advisors 
have of different investors is biased. Moreover, the few studies that do consider advisors’ 
perceptions look at their how they perceive affluent investors (Wang 1994) or students 
(Daruvala 2007), and not millionaire investors. Therefore, investigating the judgements that 
advisors make about wealthy female and male investors provides an important addition to 
current understanding of potential gender differences in the way investment recommendations 
are made.  
By drawing on attribution theory to examine the assertion that gender differences in 
investor preference may be in part perceptual and influenced by advisor bias, the present study 
makes four contributions to existing knowledge. First, it explores differences in the attributions 
made by financial advisors for male and female investors and the impact these may have on 
investment recommendations. Secondly, the study utilises a novel methodology, namely a 
vignette survey that enables attributions for male and female investors to be elicited in a 
controlled and standardised way. Thirdly, it introduces the new demographic of millionaire 
investors, a ‘hard to reach’ group rarely considered in previous studies. Fourthly, the study 
obtains ratings from experienced financial advisors whose clients are predominantly 
millionaires. 
 2.3 Hypotheses 
Drawing on behavioural finance research that finds that female investors tend to rate 
themselves as less knowledgeable, less confident and more risk averse relative to male 
investors, and attribution research which finds differences in the way that the behaviour of men 
and women is explained by others, this study tests whether a similar bias may apply to how 
financial advisors perceive the relative knowledge, control and risk tolerance of male and 
 
 
 11 
female millionaire investors. We hypothesise that, in situations where all other characteristics 
and investment circumstances are held equal: 
Hypothesis 1: Financial advisors will rate female millionaire investors to be less 
knowledgeable about investments than male millionaire investors. 
Hypothesis 2: Financial advisors will perceive female millionaire investors to have less 
control over their investments than male millionaire investors.  
Hypothesis 3: Financial advisors will allocate lower risk portfolios to female 
millionaire investors relative to male millionaire investors. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Context and Participants 
This study introduces new methodology into behavioural finance through the use of 
vignettes to elicit attributions from financial advisors about male and female millionaire 
investors under controlled conditions. The vignette experiment was conducted in the UK 
private banking sector. The UK is of particular interest due to its high proportion of millionaire 
investors and its prominence globally in the wealth management sector. This sector continues 
to grow, both in terms of total wealth under management, and specifically the growth in female 
wealth. Additionally, changes in the regulatory environment following the credit crisis has 
increased the focus that the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) places on advisors’ behaviour 
towards their clients, adding to the study’s face validity.  
Data were collected directly from financial advisors, employed by private banks and 
other wealth management firms in the UK, who are working with millionaire individual 
investors (i.e., those with more than US$1 million or equivalent to invest). This unique data set 
was accessible due to the first researcher’s extensive insight into the sector obtained through 
nearly twenty years of working in the industry. In the UK advisors are regulated by the FCA 
through their employer. The FCA requires that all advisors undertake investment and portfolio 
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construction qualifications to ensure they understand how to risk profile investors, and are 
therefore able to recommend suitable investment portfolios with an asset allocation appropriate 
to each risk profile. This training also ensures that, before providing any advice, an advisor 
must first establish which investments are suitable for a particular client using pre-designed 
investment questionnaires. These questionnaires are designed to meet regulatory requirements 
by evidencing suitable investment recommendations for clients (Estrada 2016); categorising 
investors' risk profiles using information about their personal circumstances, such as age, 
amount of wealth, source of wealth, goals, marital status, dependents, expenditure, profession, 
investment experience. Although risk profiles may vary depending on the institution, they 
typically range from 1 (risk averse) to 5 (aggressive), with each rating associated with a 
recommended target asset allocation or investment portfolio. For example, institutions may 
create model investment portfolios for each level of investor risk classification depending on 
the investor’s personal characteristics which set the boundary as to which investments are 
suitable for each investor. Although the FCA does not determine the metrics used by 
institutions it overseas the suitability process for assessing the risk investors are prepared to 
take (Financial Services Authority 2011)3F4.  
Although individual advisors are responsible for providing suitable investment advice, 
they can also influence this initial determination of the client's risk profile, thereby adding 
further opportunity for subjectivity. Importantly, advisors’ judgements of investors are critical 
for determining what investments can be offered. The industry and the financial regulator 
expect that advisors rationally follow these sorts of metrics, but as yet relatively little attention 
has been paid to the possibility that advisors are influenced by other client characteristics, like 
gender, that ought not to affect portfolio recommendations.  
3.2 Development of Vignette Questionnaire 
 
4 The Financial Services Authority underwent a name change to the Financial Conduct Authority in April 2013. 
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This study utilises a vignette based questionnaire to collect ratings for hypothetical 
millionaire investors that respondents might typically encounter in their work. Although 
vignette methodology has a long history in psychological and sociological research, it is not 
common in the finance literature. Atzmüller and Steiner (2010: 128) define a vignette as “a 
short, carefully constructed description of a person, object, or situation, representing a 
systematic combination of characteristics”. Vignettes are often used as part of a questionnaire 
in order to allow researchers to capture ratings for standardised scenarios from multiple 
respondents. By asking questions on decision-making following a brief hypothetical scenario, 
vignette methodology combines a traditional survey with an experiment and is particularly 
suited to eliciting attitudes and judgements in quantitative research (Schoenberg and Ravdal 
2000).  
In this study ten vignettes were developed; each was approximately 100 words in length 
and described a different fictional millionaire investor. Care was given to making sure that the 
narratives were realistic, and that each vignette included sufficient detail and contextual factors 
to ensure face validity, verified by professional financial advisors consulted during the 
development phase. For example, every vignette contained information about the investor that 
an advisor might expect to know soon after being introduced to a new client and would enable 
them to make judgements about their investment needs. The same categories of variables were 
included in each vignette (e.g., age, profession, wealth), but varied to increase the credibility 
and range of likely investors. 
In order to compare the effects of investor gender, two versions of each vignette were 
created: one where the investor was male and one where they were female. Thus, gender was 
allowed to vary while keeping all other details constant. Table 1 shows examples of two 
vignettes illustrating the changes made for male and female versions. For example, the first 
vignette in Table 1 is a 36 year old IT consultant with £800,000 in liquid wealth and a property 
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portfolio. Half of the respondents will rate this vignette as Susan (i.e., a woman) and half the 
respondents as Michael (i.e., a man). The second vignette portrays another fictional client, 
namely a 59 year old CEO called Nick or Anna. The methodology enables advisors to rate 
different types of fictional clients in a clean experiment where only gender is altered.  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
In order to ensure that both a female and a male version of each vignette were rated, 
two versions of the survey (i.e., survey A and survey B) were created. In both versions the 
vignettes are presented in the same order, but in version A, even-numbered vignettes describe 
male investors and odd numbered vignettes describe female investors, while in version B even-
numbered vignettes are female and odd-numbered vignettes are male. This approach follows 
the methodology pioneered by Schein (1976, Schein et al. 1996), and allows the gender of the 
hypothetical millionaire client in each vignette to vary, while controlling for other individual 
and situational factors. 
After reading each vignette, study participants were asked to respond to three questions: 
firstly, `On a scale from 1–10 how knowledgeable would you rate this client to be about 
investments?' (where 1 = not at all knowledgeable, 10 = extremely knowledgeable), secondly 
`Relative to the average investor, how much control do you think this client is likely to have 
over their investments?' (where 1 = a lot less than the average investor and 5 = a lot more than 
the average investor).  
Thirdly, respondents were presented with seven investment portfolios that varied 
according to risk and asked: ‘Which of the following portfolios would you recommend to this 
client?’ In order to enable a controlled measure of risk, seven investment portfolios were 
constructed using varied asset allocations, to reflect differing levels of risk ranging from 1 (very 
low) to 7 (very high). This approach is consistent with Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), where 
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investors select a portfolio that balances likely risk and reward (Wilford 2012), and follows 
methodology used in previous research by De Bondt (1998) and Karabulut (2010). Each 
portfolio includes a mix of investments, including stocks, bonds and other assets (Marston 
2011). Table 2 shows the asset allocation of the seven portfolios.  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
In each of the seven portfolios the asset mix is varied to represent different risk, and asset 
volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the return distribution of the portfolios. For 
example, Portfolio 1 contains 51% bonds and 19% equities, while Portfolio 7 contains 3% 
bonds and 86% equities. Portfolio 1 has the lowest risk (as measured by the standard deviation 
of the empirical distribution) and portfolio seven the highest risk, with a gradual increase in 
the ratio of risky assets (1) to higher-risk assets (7). These portfolios mirror the standard 
approach taken to match investor risk tolerance by allocating them to one of five or more risk 
profiles, and matching them with suitable portfolios with varied asset allocation. The asset 
allocation in the portfolios is derived from the FTSE Wealth Management Association Private 
Investor Indices (portfolios), regarded as benchmark portfolios for the wealth management 
industry in the UK and thus familiar to advisors (The Wealth Management Association 2015). 
Finally, biographical questions were included in the questionnaire, asking respondents to 
indicate their gender, age and the number of years they had worked as a financial advisor. 
The questionnaire was piloted with three financial advisors and three investment 
specialists, who each provided feedback on the vignettes, questions, and the portfolio 
composition. This process ensured that the questions were easy to understand, and that the 
advisors were able to correctly infer that portfolio risk increased incrementally between 
portfolios 1 to 7, without the standard deviation being disclosed to respondents. It also provided 
confirmation that the vignettes were believable and realistic (Rahman 1996) in their depiction 
 
 
 16 
of credible millionaire clients (Finch 1987). Feedback provided during piloting resulted in 
minor amendments to some questions and vignettes. The amended questionnaire was further 
tested with ten advisors who completed it online, resulting in a few additional minor changes 
to language. 
3.3 Procedure 
The online questionnaire was distributed randomly to over 400 professional financial 
advisors, whose responses were recorded anonymously. Consent was also sought from 
respondents to use their anonymised data as part of an academic study about investment advice 
provision that would be published. Distribution occurred in two ways. First, a major UK private 
bank agreed to disseminate the questionnaire to all investment advisors in their UK offices who 
were working with millionaire UK clients.  Participants were invited to take part in the research 
by a senior director, and reassured that all information would be treated in confidence such that 
respondents would be anonymous to the researchers and their employer. This generated a total 
of 50 respondents (46 male and 4 female, mean age 37.9 years and mean experience 9.0 years). 
As this institution employs approximately 200 investment advisors, the sample represented 
about 25% of the population. Secondly, a snowball sampling methodology was utilised to 
secure respondents from over ten additional financial institutions. This involved emailing 
financial advisors who were known to the researchers and working with millionaire clients. 
These individuals were invited both to complete the questionnaire and to distribute the online 
questionnaire to other colleagues in similar roles. Again, all information was provided 
anonymously. This methodology generated 79 respondents from ten UK institutions (56 male 
and 23 female, mean age 44.2 years and mean experience 14.3 years). Respondent ages ranged 
from 25 to 59 years for the first sample (A) and 27 to 67 for the second sample (B). Despite 
slight differences between the two samples, a decision was taken to treat them as a single data 
set for the purposes of analysis, given that the age range and experience of respondents in both 
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samples were broadly similar, and the target group for respondents (i.e., financial advisors 
working with millionaire investors) is an exceptionally hard-to-reach group. 
Although 151 respondents began the survey,  respondents who had not rated more than 
one vignette were deemed to be not randomly missing, and therefore excluded from the 
analysis (Newman 2014). A total of 129 respondents were included in the analysis, yielding 
1147 observations in total (64 respondents completed survey A and 65 completed survey B). 
The full sample of respondents reported in Table 3 is very similar to the demographics of the 
financial advisor population as a whole reported by Hannon (2014): 79.1% of advisors in the 
sample are male, they have a mean age of 41.74 years and an average of 12.78 years of 
experience advising wealthy clients.  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
4. Results 
In order to analyse differences between the way in which advisors perceive equivalent 
female and male investors, and how this translates into portfolio recommendations, our 
identification strategy using vignettes with gender as a treatment effect results in a simple 
approach of testing difference in means. Means were calculated and two-tailed t-tests were 
used to compare responses for knowledge rating (H1), perceived control (H2) and 
recommended risk portfolio (H3). The analysis included responses from 129 participants who 
rated the ten vignettes. Taking account of missing data this yielded a total of 1147 observations 
included in the analysis. Means of ratings were computed for the overall responses per vignette 
and then split into the gender of the vignette. Significance is reported using P values. Additional 
analysis calculating means and ratings based on the gender of the advisor are also considered.  
The results for the full sample are presented with the summary results in table 4 below. 
The overall mean computations show that advisors are on average in agreement with how 
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knowledgeable the investors in the vignettes are and the portfolios that they recommend. 
However, means show that male and female vignettes are judged to have different levels of 
control over their investments. Male vignettes are attributed an average rating of 3.27 whereas 
female vignettes were rated to have less control (M = 3.08), which is significant at the 1% 
level. The results for each rating are presented in more detail below.  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
Result 1: The results for knowledge ratings (H1) are presented in more detail in table 5. Our 
analysis does not find evidence that advisors perceive women to be significantly less 
knowledgeable than men (M = 5.76 for male vignettes and M = 5.61 for female vignettes), 
therefore we reject Hypothesis 1: ‘Financial advisors will rate female millionaires less 
knowledgeable about investments than male investors who are millionaires’. Additional t-test 
analysis reveals that female respondents rate millionaires in male vignettes to be more 
knowledgeable (M=5.60) than they do millionaires in female vignettes (M= 5.22), which is 
significant at the 5% level.  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
Result 2: The control ratings yield significant differences. Overall advisors rated female 
millionaires as having less control over their investments relative to males (M = 3.27 for male 
vignettes and M = 3.08 for female vignettes. Therefore we fail to reject Hypothesis 2: 
‘Financial advisors will perceive female millionaires to have less control over their investments 
than male investors who are millionaires’. Additional analysis taking advisor gender into 
account shows that, overall, the lowest control ratings were made by female respondents for 
female millionaires (M = 2.96), whereas female respondents rated male millionaires to have 
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the highest control over their investments (M = 3.27), significant at the 5% level. Also male 
advisors attribute lower control to female millionaires (M=3.11) versus male millionaires 
(M=3.27), significant at the 5% level (see table 6).  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
 
Result 3: T-tests revealed that when all advisors were considered together there was no 
significant difference in the type of portfolios they recommended to male and female 
millionaires (female investors M = 3.91, male investors M = 3.96). Thus hypothesis 3: 
‘Financial advisors will allocate lower risk portfolios to female millionaires relative to male 
investors who are millionaires’, was also rejected. However, inspection of the data reveals that 
the lowest risk portfolios are recommended to female investors by female advisors (M = 3.67), 
relative to male investors (M = 3.97); this difference is significant at the 10% level. Conversely 
the highest risk portfolios are more likely to be recommended to male millionaires by male 
advisors (M = 3.99) and female advisors (M = 3.97). The results for the recommended portfolio 
ratings are summarised in table 7.  
__________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________ 
 
To analyse more carefully where in the distribution these differences between gender 
occur, conditional densities are drawn which condition on the gender of the financial advisor. 
These follow the non-parametric technique proposed by Racine and Li (2004), which applies 
a kernel method of density estimation to discrete variables. Density functions that show the 
differences in the degree of knowledge, control as well as the recommended portfolios are 
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shown in figures 1 – 3. Although there is a slight shift to the left for all three variables for 
female advisors, it is not significant at the 95% level.  
__________________________________________ 
INSERT FIGURES 1, 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
__________________________________________ 
5. Discussion 
The rapid increase in the number of women millionaires in the UK, means that the way 
in which these women invest their wealth is of social and economic interest. It is also of 
particular interest to wealth management institutions that wish to attract and support female 
clients, and to institutional regulators of financial advice provided to individual investors. 
Although behavioural finance theorists demonstrate how individual investors use their own 
intuitive beliefs and apply biases when making investment decisions for themselves 
(Kahneman 2003; Benartzi and Thaler 2001), much less attention has been given to whether 
financial advisors who aid millionaire investors may display similar biases when judging the 
needs and providing investment advice for male and female clients. Consequently, there is a 
need to explore how advisors understand and respond to the needs of male and female 
millionaire investors.  
By introducing a novel vignette based methodology to finance this study draws on 
attribution theory to explore if advisors perceive investors differently due to their gender, whilst 
holding  all other variables constant. Based on previous findings in the literature about 
differences between male and female investors, and previous attribution theory research, the 
expectation was that advisors would judge female vignettes (millionaire investors) to be less 
knowledgeable, to have less control over their investments, and to recommend lower risk 
portfolios to female relative to male vignettes. This study found that advisors did not rate the 
investment knowledge of men and women differently, but that women millionaires were 
perceived to have less control over their investments.  
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Contrary to the hypotheses, the results also show that advisors did not recommend 
lower risk portfolios to investors in the female compared to male vignettes. The perceived 
control findings in this study are in line with attribution research that has found that both male 
and female observers attribute female success to less controllable causes (Silvester and 
Koczwara 2012), and judge men as likely to have more control or confidence over their actions 
(Weiner et al. 1971). Investors who are judged to have less control over their investments might 
also be perceived to be more reliant on their advisors, and more likely to seek investment advice 
(Guiso and Japelli 2006; Karabulut 2010; Bluethgen, et al. 2008). Agnew et al. (2008), for 
example, report a link between self-perceived low financial literacy, confidence and lower risk 
aversion, results which were expected to be replicated when testing for the perception that 
advisors have of investors in this study.  However, results from the present study do not provide 
evidence of differences in the social perception that advisors have regarding the financial 
literacy of men and women, instead they demonstrate that advisors recommend portfolios with 
the same allocation to risky assets to equivalent male and female investors despite judging 
women to have less control over their investments. 
Yet, when controlling for gender of advisor, the results show that both the knowledge 
that advisors perceive investors in the vignettes to have and the portfolios that they recommend 
are significantly altered. Relative to male advisors, female advisors judge female vignettes to 
have less investment knowledge, but they also recommend less risky portfolios to female 
investors than to male investors. The control rating was also significantly lower for female 
investors when controlling for the gender of both advisors and investors.  
Whilst it may be problematic to generalise with a sample of 129 advisors from ten UK 
wealth management institutions (Berk 1983), it is particularly difficult for researchers to access 
the community of advisors for millionaire investors. Indeed, the response rate for this voluntary 
survey was 38%, which is similar to the average of 35.7% cited by Baruch and Holtom (2008), 
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suggesting a good level of engagement despite the absence of financial compensation. 
Likewise, as there are only forty UK institutions that individually manage over US$50 million 
(A.T. Kearney 2013), the sample is broadly representative of the wider population. Due to the 
anonymity of the survey data, information about the characteristics of non-respondents was not 
available for comparative analysis (Viswesvaran, Barrick, and Ones 1993). While it is possible 
that this sample is not an exact representation of the advisory industry, and may be subject to 
sample selection bias (Berk 1983), we argue that it has high external validity due to its broad 
representation of a unique target population. Thus, while ratings were provided by respondents 
who were recruited in two different ways, splitting the sample into two subgroups for analysis 
purposes would have substantially reduced the sample size with effects on significance 
(Wheatley and Hills 2001) and hence the credibility of any subgroup effects (Sun et al. 2002). 
Similarly, while the proportion of women respondents in the total sample resembles that found 
in the advisory market as a whole (i.e., 21% female advisors: Hannon 2014), sample A had 
only 8% female respondents. Advisors in sample A were also slightly younger and less 
experienced than those in sample B. Consequently, it was not possible with this data to explore 
meaningful sub-group differences.  
That said, the findings presented in this paper suggest that the gender of an advisor may 
be influential in investment recommendations, with the lowest mean ratings for knowledge, 
control and portfolio recommendation all given by female advisors for female vignettes. 
Interestingly, the highest ratings on these measures are provided by male respondents for male 
vignettes. These findings deserve further exploration in future research. 
Previous research has also found that an observer’s own risk tolerance may influence 
the risk rating they make for another person (Daruvala 2007). Therefore, future studies might 
examine whether female advisors are less risk tolerant than their male peers, and thus more 
prone to recommend lower risk investments. Similarly, the level of self-rated knowledge of an 
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advisor might influence the level of knowledge they attribute to others. However, it may also 
be the case that female advisors are simply more accurate in interpreting the extent to which 
their clients feel knowledgeable, confident, and averse to risk.  
According to classical theory we would not have expected a significant difference 
between the male and female investors. Yet based on previous findings of self-perceived lower 
financial literacy, confidence and risk tolerance among women, we expected that the 
judgements or social perception that advisors make of male and female investors would follow 
a similar pattern. The data source and findings presented in this paper provide unique new 
insights into advising millionaire individuals in a study with high face validity. Although 
varied, the results illustrate that advisors interpret the needs of female millionaire investors 
differently to male investors, and that the gender of the advisor significantly contributes to 
differences in that judgement. Although advisors exhibited less bias than expected, they judge 
female investors to have significantly less control over their investments. Such findings 
highlight the complex and subjective nature of how the needs of male and female millionaires 
are understood. Financial markets regulators, and the institutions that the advisors work for, 
may trust that advisors follow metrics, yet it seems that attributional bias may also contribute 
to the investment advice received by male and female investors; with the gender of the 
professional who provides the investment advice an important consideration. 
5.1 Practical Implications 
This study has significant implications as it addresses one of the problems faced by the 
wealth management industry: how to attract and encourage wealthy female clients to invest 
their wealth. A recent report shows that only 25% of affluent women in the US have an advisor, 
and of this group 67% feel their advisor misunderstands their needs (Hewlett and Moffitt 2014). 
Moreover, women are generally less satisfied with their advisors, and more likely to perceive 
financial advising as a male orientated activity (Friedland 2013). Yet, despite significant 
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growth in female wealth, women are less likely than men to have retirement savings (Hung and 
Yoong 2010) and less likely to have a high allocation to risky assets (Sundén and Surette 1998), 
which means that with a longer life expectancy than men, women  risk outliving their savings. 
Consistently lower risk investment portfolio recommendations to female investors result in 
underinvestment relative to both the market and their peers and a likelihood of lower risk-
adjusted returns.  
It may of course also be problematic that the advisors in this study perceive women to 
be equally knowledgeable to men and to have less control over their investments but still 
recommend equally risky portfolios to women. This has potential consequences for the 
financial industry with regards to savings and retirement portfolios, and increases the scope for 
more tailored investment advice. These findings may also be of interest to financial regulators 
in relation to consideration of the fair treatment of consumers regardless of their gender, and 
the need to raise awareness among advisors of the effect that psychological heuristics can have 
on financial decision-making.  
5.2 Theoretical Implications 
Through introducing attribution theory to the finance field, the concept that social 
perceptions matter when investors make investment decisions jointly with an investment 
advisor, contributes to extant behavioural finance research. Such attributions and social 
perceptions that advisors make of millionaire investors are elicited through the employment of 
novel vignette based methodology with results that underpin previous findings in attribution 
theory where both male and female observers perceive female millionaire investors to have 
less control over their investments. Attribution theory can therefore help to inform and expand 
existing behavioural finance theory by showing that social perception also matters when 
financial advisors judge the needs of millionaire investors, potentially influencing the 
investment advice provided and ultimately how the wealth is invested. Additionally, this study 
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illustrates how the finance literature can benefit from the application of vignette methodology 
to elicit judgements in controlled experiments.  
5.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
There are several interesting areas for future research. The study can be replicated for 
less wealthy investors to explore if perceptions are different for another demographic. Future 
research could also consider geographical differences. Although out of scope in the current 
study, exploration of the correlation between advisor’s own risk tolerance and the risk 
perception of investors could add further insight and inform the findings presented in this 
paper. Increased understanding of other biases which result from agency conflicts, caused by 
mismatches between the agent’s and the principal’s own self-interests would also be beneficial. 
Such potential conflicts are important and may lead to advisors recommending riskier 
portfolios that attract higher incentives for the advisor. Additionally, millionaire investors may 
have several dedicated financial advisors, a complexity not considered in this study. Other 
studies might consider this as well as the depth and length of the relationship between the 
advisor and the investor. To advance knowledge about the interaction between financial 
advisors and investors future researchers may consider how the judgements that advisors make 
of investors match the expectation of investors. Perhaps a relative over-reliance by female 
investors on advisors means that advisors have a higher level of influence over the investments 
they recommend to female investors which might in turn affect the allocation to risky assets, 
and a possible conflict of interest. One might argue for lower risk portfolios to investors who 
display a higher level of dependence and lower level of confidence. Since this study concerns 
the study of judgements made by very experienced advisors, it may well be that this experience 
contributes to perceptual differences as experience, is negatively correlated with biases (Feng 
and Seasholes, 2005). Millionaires might also be judged differently than those who are less 
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wealthy and advisors might attribute a higher risk tolerance to millionaires who can absorb a 
higher level of risk relative to those with less in investable wealth.  
6. Conclusion 
By introducing attribution theory to behavioural finance through the employment of an 
innovative vignette based study this paper examined whether advisors alter their judgment of 
the needs of millionaire investors depending on the client’s gender. With all other variables 
held constant, advisors were asked to rate the investment knowledge and the control that 
investors have over their investments, and to recommend one of seven investment portfolios 
with varied asset allocation (risk) to ten pen portraits (vignettes) of male and female investors. 
The study tested whether previous research findings, which indicate that female investors are 
less knowledgeable, less confident and less risk tolerant relative to male investors, hold in how 
millionaire investors are perceived by advisors. The results found that both male and female 
advisors rated female investors as having less control over their investments than male 
investors suggesting that women millionaires may be perceived as less confident and more 
reliant on advice by their investment advisors. However, advisors make the same judgements 
about the investment knowledge of men and women and make equally risky portfolio 
recommendations regardless of the gender of the investor. The findings add to extant 
behavioural finance literature in relation to the potential for bias and gender differences in 
client relationships by considering the impact of social cognition (i.e., attribution theory) on 
the perceptions of investment advisors providing advice to millionaire investors. 
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Table 1. Example Vignettes     
              
       
              
(1) Susan (Michael), a 36-year old IT consultant, has done well in the London 
property boom. She (He) has generated liquid wealth of £800,000 in 
addition to a property portfolio worth £1.8 million net of mortgages. The 
portfolio generates about £105,000 bringing her (his) total yearly income to 
£180,000. Together with her (his) long-term partner she (he) is expecting a 
baby in 3 months. It is her (his) dream to resign from her (his) boring job in 
5 years to look after her (his) family. Her (his) partner has got bond and 
stock investments, but Susan (Michael) has always focused on property. 
However, she (he) realises that she (he) ought to diversify and is prepared to 
commit an initial £500,000. Susan (Michael) loves to travel and may buy a 
property abroad in the future. 
 
(2) Nick (Anna), 59, is the CEO of a FTSE250 company. You are aware that he 
(she) has about £1.5 million exposure to the company stock through 
incentive schemes. He (She) is paid £580,000 including bonuses per year, of 
which he (she) only spends half. It is very hard to get time in his (her) diary 
but he (she) is polite and forthcoming when you meet. He (She) has 
expressed an interest in bonds and asks you what alternative investments 
are. He (She) confesses to having panic-sold his (her) portfolio and lost a lot 
of money during the credit crisis. Nick (Anna) would like to hedge his (her) 
single stock exposure and invest an initial £1 million of his (her) £2.5 
million savings. He (She) is married and his (her) twins will be graduating 
from University this year. His (Her) wife (husband) would like him (her) to 
retire at 62 so that they can move to the Caribbean.  
       
Notes: gender of the client in each vignette was varied as shown in ( ). 
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Table 2. Portfolio asset allocation composition        
                 
         
Asset class Portf 1 Portf 2 Portf 3 Portf 4 Portf 5 Portf 6 Portf 7  
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)  
UK Equities 11 19 27 35 37 40 42  
International Equities 8 11 14 18 28 38 44  
Bonds 51 45 39 32 20 7 3  
Cash 6 5 5 5 4 2 0  
Commercial Property 6 5 5 5 5 5 3  
Alternatives / Hedge funds 18 15 10 5 6 8 8  
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  
                
 
Note: asset allocation of Portfolios 1 - 7 = Portf.  
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Table 3. Descriptives for respondents  
         
     
Respondents N Age Experience  
Full Sample     
All 129 41.74 12.78  
Male 102 41.14 12.42  
Female 27 44 14.15  
     
Sample A     
All 50 37.86 9.00  
Male 46 38.04 10.70  
Female 4 35.75 7.40  
     
Sample B     
All 79 44.19 14.27  
Male 56 43.68 13.84  
Female 23 45.43 15.30  
         
     
Notes: Table 3 summarises the respondents used in the analysis.  
Initially the full sample, followed by separation of Samples A & B.  
Number of respondents, mean age and years’ experience. 
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Table 4. Summary results for vignette ratings by all 
respondents.       
                        
            
 All vignettes  Male Vignettes  Female Vignettes 
Rating Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs 
            
Knowledge 5.68 2.20 1147  5.76 2.19 572  5.61 2.22 575 
Control  3.17 1.03 1147  3.27 1.02 572  3.08*** 1.02 575 
Rec. Portfolio 3.94 1.58 1147  3.96 1.58 572  3.91 1.58 575 
                        
Notes: (1) Based on responses of 129 respondents for all 10 vignettes with the number of observations (Obs) adjusted for 
missing data. *** Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 5. Knowledge ratings by gender of 
advisor and gender of vignette.          
                        
            
 All Respondents  Male Respondents  Female Respondents 
Knowledge 
Rating Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs 
            
All Vignettes 5.68 2.20 1147  5.75 2.14 919  5.41 2.41 228 
Male Vignettes 5.76 2.19 572  5.79 2.16 458  5.60 2.30 114 
Female Vignettes 5.61 2.22 575  5.71 2.12 461  5.22** 2.52 114 
                        
            
Notes: Shows the differences for the knowledge rating controlling for the gender of both the vignettes and the 
respondents. Observations = Obs. ** Significance at 5% level. 
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Table 6. Control ratings for vignettes by gender 
of advisor and gender of vignette.          
                        
            
 All Respondents  Male Respondents  Female Respondents 
Control Rating Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs 
            
All Vignettes 3.17 1.03 1147  3.19 1.00 919  3.12 1.11 228 
Male Vignettes 3.27 1.02 572  3.27 1.02 458  3.27 1.05 114 
Female Vignettes 3.08*** 1.0227 575  3.11** 0.99 461  2.96** 1.16 114 
                        
Notes: Shows the differences for the control rating controlling for the gender of both the vignettes and the respondents. Observations = 
Obs. *** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. 
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Table 7. Recommended portfolio rating by gender of 
advisor and gender of vignette.        
                        
            
 All Respondents  Male Respondents  Female Respondents 
Portfolio Rating Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs   Mean SD Obs 
            
All Vignettes 3.94 1.58 1147  3.98 1.58 919  3.75 1.56 228 
Male Vignettes 3.96 1.58 572  3.99 1.60 458  3.84 1.49 114 
Female Vignettes 3.91 1.58 575  3.97 1.56 461  3.67* 1.63 114 
          
  
      
  
    
Notes: Shows the differences for the recommended portfolio rating controlling for the gender of both the vignettes and the respondents.  
Observations = Obs. (3) * Significant at 10% level.  
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Figure 1. Conditional Density Function: Knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The density graph shows the difference in the distribution of the degree of knowledge, conditioning 
on gender of the financial advisors.  
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Figure 2. Conditional Density Function: Control.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The density graph shows the difference in the distribution of the degree of control, conditioning 
on gender of the financial advisors 
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Figure 3. Conditional Density Function: Recommended Portfolio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The density graph shows the difference in the distribution of the recommended portfolio, 
conditioning on gender of the financial advisors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
